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Abstract
Changes in the stock of inventories are important for uctuations in aggregate output. How-
ever, the possibility that rms do not sell all produced goods and inventory accumulation are
typically ignored in business cycle models. This paper captures this with a goods-market friction.
Using US data, "goods-market e¢ ciency" is shown to be strongly procyclical. By including both
a goods-market friction and a standard labor-market search friction, the model developed can
substantially magnify and propagate shocks. Despite its simplicity, the model can also replicate
key inventory facts. However, when these inventory facts are used to discipline parameter values,
then goods-market frictions are quantitatively not very important.
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1 Introduction
Firms are likely to hold back on hiring workers when demand for their products is low and consumers
may very well postpone purchases when they worry about becoming unemployed. Such interaction
between goods-market and labor-market frictions could deepen economic downturns. In modern
business cycle models, such "Keynesian" interaction is typically due to nominal frictions, that is, due
to the presence of sticky prices and wages: When prices are sticky, changes in demand have a stronger
impact on production and changes in production have a stronger impact on employment when wages
are sticky. This paper develops a business cycle model in which such Keynesian interaction is due
to the presence of real frictions in both the labor market and the goods market. With frictions in
both markets, there is a potentially powerful interaction between the goods market and the labor
market even when prices and wages are exible. This paper is related to the coordination failure
literature, but does not rely on self-fullling expectations nor on multiple equilibria.1
It is common to incorporate labor-market search frictions in business cycle models and this
approach is adopted here as well. Recently, several papers have incorporated goods-market search
frictions into business cycle models.2 Several of these papers assume that prices are exible and by
doing so make clear that Keynesian interaction between goods and labor markets is possible without
relying on price rigidities. This paper shares with the recent literature the assumptions that (i) rms
face frictions in nding buyers for their products and (ii) the severity of this friction varies over
the business cycle. In contrast to the literature, the goods-market friction is not symmetric. The
underlying idea is that rms may not sell all their products, for example, because they produce what
consumers do not want, but consumers consider what is available and the only cost in acquiring the
good is the purchase price. This is a minor di¤erence. But the advantage is that Keynesian results
in this paper do not rely on the cyclicality of consumerse¤ort to acquire goods.3
A more essential aspect in which this paper di¤ers from the literature is that the model includes
1See Cooper (1999) for an overview of coordination failure models.
2For example, Arsenau (2007), Gourio and Rudanko (2011), Mathä and Pierrard (2011), Petrosky-Nadeau and
Wasmer (2011), Bai, Ríos-Rull, and Storesletten (2012), Kaplan and Menzio (2013), and Michaillat and Saez (2013).
3 It is not clear whether consumers e¤ort to acquire goods relative to the value of purchases is procyclical or
countercyclical. In the models of Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2011) and Bai, Ríos-Rull, and Storesletten (2012),
consumers put in less e¤ort trying to acquire goods during recessions, which is bad for rms. In the model of Kaplan
and Menzio (2013), unemployed consumers have more time to allocate to activities unrelated to working. Consequently,
on average consumers put in more e¤ort to acquire goods during recessions, since there are more unemployed during
recessions. In the model of Kaplan and Menzio (2013), it is bad for rms if consumers put in more e¤ort, since this
means that consumers can visit more stores and bargain for lower prices.
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inventories. There are several reasons to include inventories. As documented in this paper, the
observed behavior of inventories is very informative about the characteristics of frictions in the goods
market and the quantitative importance of such frictions for business cycles. This is not surprising.
When there are cyclical changes in the frictions that rms face in selling products, then this is
likely to a¤ect the accumulation of inventories. Another important reason to include inventories in
business cycle models is that changes in the investment in inventories are a quantitatively important
aspect of cyclical changes in GDP. Blinder and Maccini (1991) document that the drop in inventory
investment accounted on average for 87 percent of the drop in GNP in the postwar US recessions they
considered. This paper conrms the empirical relevance of changes in investment in inventories for
cyclical uctuations in GDP, although the estimates are not as high as the one reported in Blinder
and Maccini (1991).
This paper makes four contributions. First, the paper constructs a measure of "goods-market
e¢ ciency" and documents its properties. Second, the paper develops a business cycle model with
inventories that is characterized by frictions in the labor and the goods market. Third, the paper
documents that the model can match key aspects of US business cycles and in particular the cyclical
behavior of inventories. Fourth, the paper documents the importance of goods market frictions when
the model is consistent with the cyclical behavior of inventories. These contributions are discussed
in more detail in the remainder of this section.
The measure of goods-market e¢ ciency used is the amount of goods sold relative to the sum
of newly produced goods and beginning-of-period inventories. A higher value means that rms
sell a higher fraction of available products. This e¢ ciency measure is a simple transformation of
the inventory-sales ratio; if the inventory-sales ratio decreases (increases), then the goods-market
e¢ ciency measure increases (decreases). Section 2 documents that this measure of goods-market
e¢ ciency is strongly procyclical. This is not surprising given that the inventory-sales ratio is known
to be countercyclical and the two measures are inversely related.4 A novel empirical nding is
that the goods-market e¢ ciency measure is negatively related to the beginning-of-period stock of
aggregate inventories. This last aspect of goods-market e¢ ciency turns out to play a key role in
matching the observed behavior of inventories with the theoretical model.
The empirical ndings provide the motivation for the specication of the goods-market friction
that rms face in the theoretical model developed. Consistent with the observed positive dependence
of goods-market e¢ ciency on aggregate real activity, the paper follows Diamond (1982) and lets
4Bils and Kahn (2000) document that the inventory-sales ratio is countercyclical.
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goods-market e¢ ciency vary with market size. The idea is that a rm is more likely to nd a
customer who wants the rms products in larger markets.5 The model incorporates this externality,
but the externality is not strong enough to generate multiple equilibria as in Diamond (1982).
Additional empirical support for this externality is given in Gavazza (2011); using transactions
data for commercial aircraft markets, Gavazza (2011) shows that trading frictions diminish with
the thickness of the market. In addition, goods-market e¢ ciency is assumed to decrease when
aggregate inventories increase, as indicated by the empirical analysis. Except for the presence
of inventories and a goods-market friction, the model is a standard business cycle model with a
labor-market search friction.
The model can match key facts regarding the behavior of inventories. Important facts regard-
ing the joint behavior of inventories, sales, and real activity are that sales are less volatile than
production, investment in inventories is procyclical, and the investment in inventories is positively
correlated with sales.6 These properties have surprised the profession because they are inconsistent
with the view that rms smooth production and use inventories as a bu¤er against unforeseen sales
uctuations. Building models that can match the facts turned out to be a challenging exercise.
There are now several ingenious business cycle models that are consistent with observed behavior,
but successful inventory models tend to be characterized by non-trivial features such as Ss bands.7
In contrast, the model in this paper is extremely simple and can also match the facts. In existing
models, the accumulation of inventories is a non-trivial choice problem for the rm. In the bench-
mark version of this papers model, rms always try to sell all available goods and goods end up in
inventories only because rms are not successful in selling goods. In this version of the model, rms
cannot a¤ect the goods-market friction they face, but they could choose to accumulate additional
inventories. However, it is never optimal to do so. In the appendix, a version of the model is
developed in which rms can a¤ect the severity of the goods-market friction they face and thus
inventory accumulation by changing the price they charge. This version is shown to be identical to
the simpler version of the model with a slightly adjusted specication for the goods-market friction.8
5The idea is that sellers o¤er di¤erent types of products and that the chance of producing goods that customers
do not want is smaller in bigger markets. That is, as the market grows, the law of large numbers becomes more
appropriate and uncertainty about the outcome and the chance of mismatch become smaller.
6See Blinder and Maccini (1991), Ramey and West (1999), Bils and Kahn (2000), and McMahon (2011) for a
discussion.
7Exemplary papers on this road towards success are Eichenbaum (1989), Ramey (1991), Bils and Kahn (2000),
Coen-Pirani (2004), and Khan and Thomas (2007).
8This modication would be counteracted in the calibration phase, since the calibration procedure matches observed
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To match the inventory facts, the behavior of the goods-market e¢ ciency measure has to be
consistent with its observed properties. In particular, both the observed positive dependence on
aggregate real activity and the observed negative dependence of the goods-market e¢ ciency measure
on aggregate inventories are necessary. The simplicity of this approach to model inventories makes
it possible to incorporate it in a broad range of business cycle models and by doing so include an
important factor behind cyclical changes in aggregate output into the analysis.
The model is used to assess the importance of the goods-market friction for magnifying and
propagating shocks when prices and wages are exible. The paper documents that the procyclical
aspect of the goods-market e¢ ciency measure can create a powerful mechanism to magnify and
propagate shocks. This is not too surprising, since Diamond (1982) shows that multiple equilibria
are possible if the dependence of the goods-market friction on aggregate activity is strong enough. A
more interesting question is whether cyclical changes in goods-market e¢ ciency are still important
when the model is consistent with observed inventory facts. The answer is no for two reasons. The
rst reason is that the positive dependence of goods-market e¢ ciency on aggregate activity cannot
be too strong. Consider a shock that negatively a¤ects real activity. If the goods-market e¢ ciency,
i.e., the ease with which rms can nd customers, drops a lot during economic downturns, then
inventories would increase during recessions, whereas they decrease in the data, and sales would
drop by more than output, whereas they drop by less in the data. The second reason is that the
negative dependence of the goods-market e¢ ciency measure on aggregate inventories also plays
an important role in matching key inventory facts. This negative dependence means that cyclical
changes in goods-market e¢ ciency are short-lived. That is, following a negative shock, goods-market
e¢ ciency deteriorates initially, but it recovers quickly as the stock of inventories is reduced. The
last section of the paper discusses some reasons why cyclical changes in goods-market e¢ ciency
may still be important, but the conclusion of this paper is that the observed behavior of inventories
suggests that interaction between goods-market frictions and labor-market frictions does not seem
to be very important, at least not in the type of model considered here and when prices and wages
are exible.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the goods-market
e¢ ciency measure used, its relationship to the inventory-sales ratio, and describes key aspects of
its observed cyclical behavior. Section 3 describes the model. Section 4 motivates the parameter
choices. Section 5 discusses the results. The last section concludes.
properties of the total goods-market friction, i.e., the part that rms take as given and the part that rms can control.
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2 Empirical motivation
This paper focuses on the role of cyclical uctuations in the e¢ ciency of the process to get produced
products into the hands of buyers. This section documents the cyclical behavior of this "goods-
market e¢ ciency" and links the results to known properties of the cyclical behavior of inventories.
2.1 Goods-market e¢ ciency
Let Yt be total production in period t and let Xt 1 be the stock of inventories carried over from the
last period after depreciation. The maximum that could be sold in period t is equal to Yt + Xt 1.
Actual sales, St, are typically less. One reason is that goods that are ready to be sold do not nd
a buyer in the current period. Another reason is that some nished goods have not ended up on
store shelves yet and are not ready to be sold. Finally, sales will also be less than Yt +Xt 1 if Xt 1
includes unnished goods.
Goods-market e¢ ciency, y;t, is dened as
y;t =
St
Yt +Xt 1
: (1)
This measure describes how many goods are sold relative to the sum of newly produced goods and
the amount of goods carried over as inventories from last period. The amount produced, Yt, is equal
to the amount sold, St, plus the investment in inventories. That is,
Yt = St + (X
eop
t  Xt 1) ; (2)
where Xeopt is the level of inventories at the end of period t before depreciation. Combining the last
two equations gives
y;t =
St
St +X
eop
t
=
1
1 +Xeopt =St
: (3)
That is, goods-market e¢ ciency is inversely related to the inventory-sales ratio and both measures
can be interpreted as measures that describe the e¢ ciency of getting products in the hands of the
customer.9
2.2 Cyclical properties of goods-market e¢ ciency
The analysis is based on quarterly private non-farm inventory data from 1967Q1 to 2012Q, published
by the Bureau of Economic Analysis.10 Results reported here are based on aggregate data and
9 If Xt 1 includes unnished goods, then the e¢ ciency measure could capture more than just frictions in the goods
market. In particular, it could also include e¢ ciencies in the production process.
10Detailed information about data sources is given in appendix A.
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sales data are nal sales, either nal total sales by domestic businesses or nal sales of goods
and structures. Appendix B.1 reports results based on disaggregated data for the following ve
sectors: durable goods manufacturing, non-durable goods manufacturing, durable goods wholesale,
non-durable goods wholesale, and retail.
The data are detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) lter in order to characterize data
properties at business cycle frequencies. Two band-pass lters are used to study the possibility that
data properties are di¤erent at high frequencies. The rst extracts uctuations associated with
cycles that have a period of less than one year and the second those that have a period of less than
two years.11
Table 1 provides summary statistics and conrms some well-known facts about inventory behav-
ior. In particular, inventories and sales are positively correlated at business cycle frequencies. At
higher frequencies, however, there is a negative correlation between sales and inventories.12 Sales are
also positively correlated with the investment in inventories.13 That is, inventories tend to increase
during periods when the cyclical component of sales is positive. This property is closely related
to another well-known property, namely that output is more volatile than sales.14 For the series
considered here, output is roughly ten percent more volatile. This well-known ordering of volatilities
has challenged the literature to come up with innovative inventory theories, since the traditional
assumption of increasing marginal costs implies that rms would like to smooth production by using
inventories as a bu¤er to absorb sales shocks.
The mean values of the goods-market e¢ ciency for the two measures are equal to 40% and 55%.
That is, quite a large fraction of newly produced output and inventories does not reach consumers
within the quarter. Figure 1 displays the cyclical behavior of the goods-market e¢ ciency measure.
The solid line corresponds to the cyclical component of GDP (top panel) and the goods-market
e¢ ciency based on nal sales of goods and structures (bottom panel). To better understand the
11The detrended value of an observation is obtained using a band-pass lter that uses the observation itself and 12
lagging and 12 leading observations.
12Similar results are reported in Wen (2005).
13Since inventory investment can take on negative values, it is not possible to take logarithms to obtain a scale-
free variable. The following is done to construct the cyclical component of inventory investment. First, inventory
investment is divided by the trend value of GDP. Second, the HP-lter is applied to this ratio.
14Since output equals sales plus investment in inventories, output is necessarily more volatile than sales if sales and
investment in inventories are postively correlated. Here, statistics are calculated for the logarithms of the variables.
Consequently, the simple additive relationship no longer holds as an identity, but the logic caries over to the analysis
using logarithms.
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importance of the cyclical changes, the mean of the goods-market e¢ ciency measure is added to
its cyclical component. The gure documents that the e¢ ciency measure is clearly procyclical.
Since goods-market e¢ ciency is a monotone inverse function of the inventory-sales ratio, this is
just another way to state the well-known fact that the inventory-sales ratio is countercyclical. The
correlation between goods-market e¢ ciency and GDP is equal to 0.61 for the measure based on nal
sales of goods and structures. The magnitudes of the cyclical uctuations are nontrivial. The cyclical
component of the goods-market e¢ ciency varies from a minimum of 38.2% to a maximum of 41.8%.
Relative to the inventory-sales ratio, an advantage of the goods-market e¢ ciency measure is that
it is easier to interpret the magnitude of its cyclical uctuations and to understand how important
observed cyclical uctuations potentially are for, for example, rm protability. In particular, the
observed di¤erence between the just reported minimum and maximum values would correspond to a
8.5% drop in the sales price if rms would not be able to sell unsold goods in subsequent periods.15
If one compares this with, for example, the usual magnitude of uctuations in aggregate TFP, then
these are numbers that cannot be ignored.16
2.3 Tracking goods-market e¢ ciency over the business cycle
To shed more light on the cyclical properties of goods-market e¢ ciency, the following projection is
calculated ey;t = y eYt + x eXt 1 + ut; (4)
where the tilde indicates that the series have been detrended. Details of this empirical exercise are
given in appendix B.2. For all cases considered, the estimate for y is positive and the estimate for
x is negative. Moreover, the t improves considerably if inventories are included in the basis of
the projection.
The bottom panel of gure 1 plots the results for the goods-market e¢ ciency measure based on
nal sales of goods and structures for the preferred detrending procedure. The dotted line indicates
the projection of the goods-market e¢ ciency measure on just the cyclical GDP component. The
dashed line is the projection on both cyclical GDP and cyclical inventories. The cyclical component
of GDP clearly tracks key changes in the goods-market e¢ ciency measures. When inventories are
15Consequences for rm prots are less dramatic if inventories can be carried into the next period. However,
inventory carrying costs are non-trivial. Richardson (1995) argues that inventory carrying costs are between 25% and
55% of the stock of inventories.
16Recall that the standard deviation of aggregate TFP is typically assumed to be
p
0:0072= (1  0:952), which is
equal to 2:2 per cent.
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added to the basis of the projection, the projected values capture the severity of the fall in the
goods-market e¢ ciency during downturns much better. This may be surprising, since inventories
are procyclical and the projection coe¢ cient for inventories is negative. This would suggest that the
tted value of ey;t should decrease by less when inventories are added to the projection. The reason
this does not always happen is the following. Cyclical uctuations in inventories are larger than
cyclical uctuations in GDP. Moreover, it takes time to build down the large increase in the cyclical
component of inventories that is formed during a boom. Consequently, the cyclical component of
inventories can still be positive when the cyclical component of GDP is already negative. During such
episodes both the negative cyclical component of GDP and the (still) positive cyclical component
of inventories push the value of the goods-market e¢ ciency down. This is exactly what happened
during some of the deep recessions in the sample and can explain the improved t during severe
downturns when lagged inventories are included in the projection equation.
The explanatory variables are endogenous variables. Thus, these are just projections and the
coe¢ cients do not necessarily capture the causal e¤ect of a right-hand side variable on the dependent
variable. Nevertheless, the results do hint at the possibility that the process of getting goods in
the hands of the consumer becomes easier when aggregate real activity increases and becomes more
di¢ cult (per unit of available good for sale) when rms have more goods in inventories. Independent
evidence for the estimates found here is given in section 5 in which it is shown that the theoretical
model needs a positive value for y and a negative value for x to match observed inventory facts.
2.4 Inventory accumulation during the recent recession
Although, inventories are procyclical at business cycle frequencies, they are countercyclical at higher
frequencies as pointed out by Wen (2005) and conrmed here. The latter result is consistent with
an increase in inventories at the onset of a recession. However, aggregate inventories follow changes
in GDP quite quickly; during the recent recession, aggregate inventories also lag GDP, but the lag
seems to be not more than one quarter.17
The behavior of the aggregate series hide quite divergent behavior for the components. For
example, from 2007Q3 to 2008Q2 (2008Q3), inventories of the durables-goods wholesale-trade sector
increased by 4.2% (3.2%) compared with a drop in GDP of 1.1% (3.3%). Even larger increases
are observed when inventories of particular subsectors are considered. Inventories of the "motor
vehicles parts and supplies merchant" wholesale industry increased by 8% (11%) from 2007Q3 to
17See appendix B.3.
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2008Q2 (2008Q3). Interestingly, the inventories of this sector display massive drops in subsequent
quarters.18 Inventories of the computers and software merchant wholesale industry increased by
10% (4%) from 2007Q3 to 2008Q2 (2008Q3). In contrast, these inventories did not display sharp
drops in subsequent quarters. The largest increase in inventories is observed in the petroleum and
coal product manufacturing industry. Inventories in this sector increased by 23% from 2007Q3 to
2008Q1.
3 Model
There are three types of agents in the economy. The rst is a representative household that receives
the earnings from its members and determines how much of aggregate income to consume and how
much to invest in capital. This representative household consists of a continuum of entrepreneurs
and a continuum of workers. This section describes the choice problems of the three di¤erent agents,
the characteristics of the labor and the goods market, wage setting, and the equilibrium conditions.
Notation and reason for the endowment good. Aggregate variables, such as market prices
and choices made by the representative household, are denoted by uppercase characters. Variables
associated with choices of the individual rms are denoted by lowercase characters. Prices are
expressed in terms of an endowment good. This good plays no role in the model at all, but is
helpful to describe price and wage setting. In particular, it makes it clear that the price of the
market-produced consumption good is fully exible and adjusts to clear the goods market. By
focusing on the case with exible prices, it becomes clear that there is an interaction between
frictions in the goods market and frictions in the labor market even when prices and wages are
exible. All variables that are expressed in units of the endowment good are denoted by a symbol
with a circumex. In appendix B.4, it is shown that the model equations can be rewritten to a
system of equations in which the endowment good does not appear.
Household. A representative household chooses the consumption of the market-produced good,
Ct, the consumption of the endowment good, Ce;t, and the amount of capital to carry over into the
next period, Kt. For stock variables, such as Kt, the subscript t means that it is determined in
period t, and available for production in period t+ 1.
18The American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 is likely to have played a role, but inventories started to
drop before the act was signed into law on February 17 2009.
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The household consists of a continuum of workers that supply labor inelastically. The total mass
of workers is given by N and the mass of employed workers is equal to Nt. The representative
household receives income from employment, cWtNt 1, income from renting out capital, bRtKt 1,
and income from rm ownership, bDt.
The maximization problem of the representative household is given by
V (St) = max
Ct;Ce;t;It;Kt
C1 t   1
1   + U(Ce;t) + Et [V (St+1)]
s.t.
bPtCt + bPtIt + Ce;t = Ce + bRtKt 1 +cWtNt 1 + bDt; (5)
It = Kt   (1  k)Kt 1; (6)
where It is investment, Ce is the quantity of the endowment good received, and St is the set of
state variables.19
The rst-order conditions are given by
e;t =
@U (Ce;t)
@Ce;t
; (7)
bPte;t = C t ; (8)
bPte;t = Et he;t+1  bRt+1 + bPt+1 (1  k)i : (9)
As explained below, transactions in the goods market are characterized by a friction. However, the
friction only a¤ects the ability of the rm to nd a trading partner; consumers can buy whatever they
want without incurring any disutility or any other type of cost except having to pay for the goods
acquired. Consequently, the household problem is characterized by the standard set of equations.20
19The (not frequently used) symbols for the value function and the set of state variables are in bold and should be
distinguished from the symbols for sales, St, and vacancies, Vt, which are not bold characters.
20 If the household chooses negative gross investment, then equation (5) implies that capital goods are transformed
into goods that are immediately available for consumption without any cost or friction. This is a bit strange, since
rms do face frictions when selling goods to consumers. This is not an issue, however, since gross investment turns
out to be always positive.
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Existing rms/jobs. A rm consists of one entrepreneur and one worker. The rm hires capital
to produce output. The Bellman equation of the entrepreneurs problem is given by
bv(xt 1;St) = max
yt;kt;xt
0@ y;t (yt + xt 1) bPt   bRtkt  cWt
+ (1  n)Et [
t+1bv(xt;St+1)]
1A
s.t.
yt = 0 exp (Zt) k

t ; (10)
xt = (1  x) (1  y;t) (yt + xt 1); (11)
where 
t+1 is the marginal rate of substitution between one unit of wealth this period and one unit
of wealth the next period. That is,

e;t+1 =
e;t+1
e;t
=

Ct+1
Ct
  bPtbPt+1 : (12)
Moreover, n denotes the probability of exogenous rm exit.21 Zt is an exogenous random variable
a¤ecting productivity and its law of motion is given by
Zt = Zt 1 + "t with "t  N
 
0; 2

:
The amount of products available for sale consists of newly produced output, yt, and inventories
available at the beginning of the period t, xt 1. The probability to sell a good is equal to y;t.
Thus, the quantity of unsold products is equal to (1  y;t) (0 exp (Zt) kt 1 + xt 1) of which the
rm carries a fraction (1  x) as inventories into the next period. The parameter x captures both
physical depreciation as well as loss in value for other reasons.
Firms take y;t as given. In appendix D, it is shown that this version of the model is identical
to a version in which rms can a¤ect the goods-market friction they face by changing the prices
they charge when a slightly di¤erent specication for the goods-market friction is used.
The following rst-order conditions characterize the solution of the entrepreneurs choice prob-
lem:
bRt = y;t bPt + (1  y;t) (1  x) bx;tA exp (Zt) k 1t ; (13)
bx;t = (1  n)Et 
e;t+1@bv (xt;St+1)
@xt

: (14)
Here bx;t is the value of relaxing the constraint given in equation (11). It represents the value
of leaving period t with one more unit of inventories (after depreciation). The value of a unit of
21n is also the worker separation rate, since each rm consists of one worker.
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inventories at the beginning of the period is given by
bvx;t = @bv (xt 1;St)
@xt 1
=
0@ y;t bPt
+ (1  y;t) (1  x) bx;t
1A : (15)
Using this equation, rst-order condition (14) can be written as
bx;t = (1  n)Et
24
e;t+1
0@ y;t+1 bPt+1
+ (1  y;t+1) (1  x) bx;t+1
1A35 : (16)
Choosing to accumulate additional inventory. In the benchmark version of the model, rms
take the goods-market friction as given and passively accumulate inventories. The question arises
whether it could be optimal to accumulate additional inventories. That is, could it ever be optimal
to keep some goods in storage instead of trying to sell them? The answer is no. If a rm puts a unit
of goods on the market, then the expected payo¤ is equal to y;t bPt + (1  y;t) (1  x) bx;t. If it
chooses to keep the unit in inventories, then the expected payo¤ is equal to (1  x) bx;t. It would
only do the latter if bx;t > bPt= (1  x). Thus, a rm would choose to put a good into inventories if
the value of doing so is su¢ ciently above the market value of a market-produced good this period.
This never happens.22
Firm heterogeneity and rm value. A newly created rm starts with zero inventories. As
time goes by, the rm will accumulate inventories. Firms only di¤er in the amount of inventories
they hold. Moreover, the only aspect of the distribution of inventories that is relevant for agents
decisions and the behavior of aggregate variables is the aggregate level of inventories. Although y;t
is allowed to depend on aggregate inventories, the assumption is made that y;t does not depend on
the rms level of inventories. This assumption implies that vx;t does not depend on the level of
xt 1. Consequently, bv (xt 1;St) = bv (0;St) + xt 1bvx;t: (18)
That is, the value of each rm consists of two parts. The rst part is the value of the rm without
inventories, bv (0;St). The second part is the value of the stock of inventories, xt 1bvx;t. Reallocations
22To understand why this is the case, suppose that there is no uncertainty. If bx;t= bPt > (1  x) 1, then equations
(9) and (16) imply that
(1  n) bRt+1= bPt+1 + (1  k)
"
y;t+1 + (1  y;t+1) (1  x)
bx;t+1bPt+1
#
=
bx;tbPt > 11  x ; (17)
which implies that x;t+1= bPt+1 is also bigger than (1  x) 1 unless the net return on capital bRK;t+1= bPt+1   K is
su¢ ciently negative. Such speculative events do not occur in this model.
12
of inventories across rms have no aggregate consequences, since bvx;t does not depend on the level
of xt.
The value of a rm with no inventories is given by
bv (0;St) =
0@ y;t bPt0 exp (Zt) kt   bRtkt  cWt
+ (1  n)Et [
t+1bv((1  y;t) (1  x)0 exp (Zt) kt ;St+1)]
1A (19)
=
0BBB@
y;tPt0 exp (Zt) k

t   bRtkt  cWt
+ (1  n)Et
24
t+1
0@ bv(0;St+1)
+ (1  y;t) (1  x)0 exp (Zt) kt bvx;t+1
1A35
1CCCA :
where kt is the optimal choice for capital.
Using equation (15), the last equation can be written as
bv(0;St) =
0BBB@
0@ (y;t bPt + (1  y;t) (1  x) bx;t)0 exp (Zt) kt
  bRtkt  cWt
1A
+ (1  n)Et [
t+1bv(0;St+1)]
1CCCA : (20)
Labor market and labor market friction. Job creation requires an entrepreneur starting a
project and nding a worker. The per-period cost of this joint activity is equal to  units of the
market good. The assumption of free entry implies that in equilibrium the cost of creating a job
equals the expected benet. This means that
 bPte;t = f;tEt [e;t+1bv (0;St+1)] ; (21)
where f;t is the number of matches per vacancy.
The total number of jobs created, Nnewt , depends on the number of vacancies posted, Vt, and
the number of unemployed workers (N  Nt 1). The matching technology is characterized by a
Cobb-Douglas production function, thus23
Nt = (1  n)Nt 1 + 0V 1t (N  Nt 1)1 1 ; and (22)
f;t = 0

N  Nt 1
Vt
1 1
: (23)
Total investment in job creation is equal to  Vt:
23We allow for the possibility that Nnewt > Vt, that is, the number of matches could exceed the number of vacancies.
In simulated data this does happen, but not very often. If it happens, then rms end up with more than one worker
per vacancy. This is not problematic as long as f;t is not interpreted as a probability. Imposing that Nnewt  Vt
makes it more di¢ cult to solve the model accurately. The case in which Nnewt > (N  Nt 1) did not occur.
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Goods market and the goods-market friction. In the description above, rms do not always
sell their products. This is motivated with a very simple matching friction according to which the
rm does not nd a buyer for every product it puts up for sale. If the standard approach would
be used, then the amount of goods available as well as the search e¤ort by consumers would a¤ect
total sales. It obviously makes sense to assume that consumers have to put in some e¤ort to buy
products, which for some consumers is an enjoyable activity and for some it is not. It is less clear,
however, whether changes in the amount of e¤ort that consumers put into the activity of acquiring
goods are important for cyclical uctuations in the number of goods rms sell when one controls
for changes in demand for the good itself. Such changes do play a role in Petrosky-Nadeau and
Wasmer (2011), Bai, Ríos-Rull, and Storesletten (2012), and Michaillat and Saez (2013). In the
models of these papers, recessions are deeper because shopping itself requires e¤ort?24 That may
be the case, but the search friction adopted here does not rely on changes in the search e¤ort of
consumers. Here it is assumed that variations in search e¤ort over and above a minimum level are
not important for the actual number of transactions and the following formulation is used:25
St = y;t (Nt 1yt +Xt 1) ; (24)
and y;t is given by
y;t = y + y (Yt   Y ) + x (Xt 1  X) ; (25)
where y  0, x  0, and a bar under a symbol indicates that it is the variables steady state
value. A positive dependence of y;t on the size of the market, Yt = ytNt 1, is similar to the
24 In fact, one could argue that unemployed workers looking to buy something can devote more time searching for
the best "match", which could imply that search frictions in the goods market are less severe during recessions, since
more consumers are unemployed during recessions.
25This formulation implicitly imposes that customers do put in the minimum level required so that sales are not
zero. A more complete specication would be the following:
St =
8<: y;t (Nt 1yt +Xt 1)
1 E2 if Et  E
0 if Et < E
0 < 1; 2  1;
where Et denotes the e¤ort level and E denotes the minimum e¤ort level, e.g., the cost of going to the shopping mall.
If an increase in Et reduces utility, then Et = E. The assumption is made that the disutility of putting in E is low
enough, so that Et is always equal to E. We also assume that 1 = 1. For the results in this paper, the value of 1
does not matter, since a process for y;t is chosen such that goods-market e¢ ciency, i.e., the level of sales, St, relative
to the amount of available goods, Nt 1yt + Xt 1, mimics the cyclicality of its empirical counterpart. The lower 1,
the more procyclical y;t has to be to make goods-market e¢ ciency procyclical, that is, the calibrated value of y
would be higher.
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search externality in the pathbreaking model in Diamond (1982). Moreover, a positive value for y
is consistent with the empirical ndings based on aggregate data of section 2.3 and the empirical
ndings based on commercial aircraft markets of Gavazza (2011). The empirical analysis of this
paper indicates a negative dependence of y;t on beginning-of-period aggregate inventories. It does
not seem unreasonable, that a higher stock of inventories reduces the chance of selling a given
good.26 For example, an increase in inventories could reduce goods-market e¢ ciency if goods are
competing for shelve space and/or sales sta¤. But, this raises the question why it also would not be
more di¢ cult to sell goods when the amount of newly produced goods, Yt, increases. However, there
is an important di¤erence between a higher GDP, Yt, and a higher level of aggregate inventories,
Xt 1. A higher level of GDP not only means that the supply of goods increases, it also means
that demand increases, since higher production means higher income. In contrast, a higher level of
beginning-of-period aggregate inventories denitely means that the supply of goods is higher, but
will in general not lead to an equal increase in income.27
Wages. Instead of relying on a theory such as Nash bargaining to describe wage setting, I adopt
a exible approach to model the behavior of the real wage rate. In particular, the wage rate rule is
given by cWtbPt = !0
0@ !1 ((y;t bPt+(1 y;t)(1 x)bx;t)0kt   bRtkt)bPt
+ (1  !1) ((y
bP+(1 y)(1 x)bx)0k bRk)bP
1A ; (26)
where a lower bar indicates the steady state value, 0  !1  1, 0 < !0 < 1, and all variables are
expressed in units of the market-produced good. The two terms on the right-hand side are the level
of current-period revenues net of rental costs with unsold goods valued at (1 x)bx;t and its steady
state equivalent. If !1 = 0, then the real wage rate is xed. If !1 > 0, then wages increase with the
rms net revenues. !0 indicates the average share of revenues net of rental costs that goes to the
worker. The other fraction goes to the entrepreneur as compensation for creating the job.
26As shown below, the computational analysis is made a lot easier by letting the goods-market friction that a rm
faces depend on aggregate inventories and not the rms own inventory levels. A motivation for the dependence of
y;t on aggregate inventories is given in appendix D, in which a version of the model is developed in which a rm can
a¤ect the goods-market e¢ ciency they face by changing the price it charges.
27 Inventories are produced in the past. Workers that produced these inventories were paid in the past. Depending on
how inventories are valued, the production of inventories may even have generated income through prots. The actual
sale of inventories may generate additional income in the current period when the sale price exceeds the accounting
price used to value inventories, but the value of this additional income is likely to be less than the total value of the
inventories available for sale.
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Goods-market equilibrium. Total demand for goods is equal to Ct + It +  Vt. In equilibrium,
the price level bPt is such that the implied amount that customers demand, St, and the implied
amount that rms supply, Qt, is such that
St = y;tQt; where (27)
Qt = Nt 10 exp (Zt) kt +Xt 1: (28)
The easiest interpretation of the goods-market friction is that it literally reduces the amount of
goods that can be e¤ectively supplied to customers in the current period. Given the reduction in
the supply, this market is identical to a competitive market. y;t can also be interpreted as the
probability that a good gets sold. With this interpretation, it is more important to specify what
rms are allowed to do during the period. If a rm did not sell some products, then it has an
incentive to lower the price of these unsold goods if the goods can still be sold within the same
period. This possibility would have to be ruled out. That is, rms only nd out at the end of the
period whether a good is sold or not. At that point, the next period starts. At the beginning of this
next period, a good that is newly produced is not distinguishable from a good that was produced in
the past and did not sell (adjusted for any possible depreciation). Consequently there is no reason
why the rm o¤ering goods out of inventories should charge lower prices.
For either interpretation the question arises whether a rm could not a¤ect the goods-market
friction it faces by changing the price they charge. In a standard competitive market, rms would
make negative prots if they would charge a price below the market price. Here, existing rms
actually make a strictly positive prot, because of the search friction in the labor market. In
appendix D, a version of the model is developed in which rms can a¤ect goods-market e¢ ciency
and thus inventory accumulation by changing the price they charge. In equilibrium, the price is
such that the benet of lowering the price, i.e., increasing goods-market e¢ ciency and selling more,
is equal to the loss, i.e., having to sell goods at a lower price. This more involved version of the
model turns out to be identical to the simpler version discussed here for a slight modication of the
specication for y;t.
Aggregation and equilibrium. Individual rms have di¤erent levels of inventories. For ex-
ample, newly created rms have no inventories at all. But it is easy to obtain an expression for
aggregate inventories. All rms face the same value for y;t, which implies that all rms choose the
same level for capital, i.e., ki;t = kt. The law of motion for aggregate inventories, Xt, is thus equal
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to
Xt = (1  n) (1  x)
X
i
[(1  y;t) (0 exp (Zt) kt ) + xi;t 1]
= (1  n) (1  x) [Nt 1 (1  y;t)0 exp (Zt) kt ] + (1  y;t)Xt 1
= (1  n) (1  x) (1  y;t)
 
0 exp (Zt)K

t 1N
1 
t 1 +Xt 1

:
Equilibrium in the rental market for capital goods requires that
Nt 1kt = Kt 1; (29)
that is, the amount of capital rms choose in period t, kt, is equal to the available amount of capital
per rm. Total amount of cash ows generated in the corporate sector, bDt, is given by
bDt = y;t bPt (Nt 10 exp (Zt) kt +Xt 1) cWtNt 1   bRtKt 1    Vt: (30)
An equilibrium is a set of functions y (St), f (St), bP (St), and cW (St) and a set of policy func-
tions for the agentschoices such that (i) the policy functions solve the corresponding optimization
problems taking probabilities and prices as given and (ii) and the policy functions imply y (St),
f (St), bP (St), and cW (St).
Walras law. Goods market equilibrium requires that
Ct + It +  Vt = y;t
 
0 exp (Zt)K

t N
1 
t +Xt 1

:
This equation is implied by the budget constraint of the household and the denition of bDt.
4 Calibration
The parameters , , k, and  are set to standard values. In particular,  = 0:99,  = 0:3,
k = 0:025, and  = 1. Typical values for the parameters of the law of motion for productivity, 
and , are 0:95 and 0:007. In addition, the results are given for a process with a value for  equal to
0:7 and a value for  such that the volatility of Zt is the same for the two processes. By considering
a less persistent process for the stochastic driving variable, it becomes clear that the model can
generate very persistent behavior even when Zt itself is not that persistent. The depreciation rate
of inventories, x, is set equal to 0:10. This captures physical depreciation, but also other possible
reasons for value reduction and storage costs.28
28The value of this parameter is conservative. It is slightly lower than the value used by Khan and Thomas (2007),
who calculate the cost of inventory storage cost to be equal to 12% of the value of inventories held. Their calculations
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The wage process is characterized by two parameters, !0 and !1. The value of !0 is chosen
to match a measure of observed employment volatility, namely  (lnN) = (lnY ). The value of the
target is equal to 0:466 which is also used in Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2009). Several empirical
studies suggest that wages are not that responsive.29 Following Den Haan and Kaltenbrunner (2009),
!1 is set equal to 3=4, that is, wages respond quite strongly to current-period prots. Thus, the
results here do not rely on having sticky wages.30
The specication for goods-market e¢ ciency depends on three parameters, y, y, and x. The
value of y is the steady state value of y;t and is set equal 0:4, which is the average of the observed
measure for goods-market e¢ ciency for nal sales of domestic businesses, as documented in table
1. As discussed below, the values of y and x are chosen to match a measure of the volatility of
y;t, namely  (y) = (Y ), and a measure of the volatility of sales, namely  (S) = (Y ).
The remaining parameters are related to employment determination. Following the literature,
1 is set equal to 0:5, which means that the elasticity of f;t with respect to labor market tightness is
equal to one half.31 Based on results in Den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000), the job destruction
rate, n, is set equal to 0:052 and the values for the scaling coe¢ cient in the matching function, 0,
and the cost of starting a project,  , are such that the steady state unemployment rate is equal
to 12% and the steady state value for the number of matches per vacancy is equal to 0:71.32 This
measure for the unemployment rate takes into account those workers that indicate that they would
like to work but are not counted in the formal unemployment denition.
5 Results
Two experiments are discussed to bring to light key properties of the model. In the rst experiment,
the ability to sell, y;t only depends on aggregate output and not on beginning-of-period aggregate
inventories. The parameter a¤ecting the dependence of y;t on aggregate output, y, is chosen such
that the volatility and the procyclical behavior of goods-market e¢ ciency, y;t, match their empirical
are based on data provided by Stock and Lambert (1987) and Richardson (1995). The estimates of the latter are
substantially higher, because they include the cost of money, insurance, and taxes, which should not be part of x in
this model.
29This is true for results based on estimated DSGE models and for results based on micro-level wage data. See
Barattieri, Basu, and Gottschalk (2010).
30 In fact, the value of !1 is not important in this paper. The reason is that !0 is set to match observed employment
volatility. If !1 is lowered, then a higher value of !0 would ensure that employment volatility would not be a¤ected.
31Empirical support for this value is given in Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001).
32The latter is based on van Ours and Ridder (1992).
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counterparts. Another key parameter in this experiment is !0, the share of revenues that accrues to
the workers. Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) point out that the response of employment to changes
in rm revenues is larger when !0 is higher and the prot margin is, thus, lower. Therefore, changes
in y;t will have a larger impact on the economy if !0 is closer to 1. To discipline the models
response to changes in y;t, the value of !0 is chosen such that the model generates a realistic
amount of employment volatility.33
In the second experiment, y;t depends on aggregate activity, and motivated by this papers
empirical ndings depends negatively on the beginning-of-period aggregate level of inventories.
Finding the parameter values at which the model exactly hits the targets entails a non-trivial
search in the parameter space. Moreover, the calibration procedure relies on second-order moments,
the calculation of which requires a numerical solution of the policy functions. Consequently, a fast
solution method is needed. The results reported are based on rst-order perturbation. At the
calibrated parameter values, the model is also solved with a global solution method and the results
reported are very similar for the two solution methods.
5.1 The role of a procyclical goods-market friction for business cycles
As documented in section 2, goods-market e¢ ciency, y;t, is procyclical and quite volatile. The
ability to sell, y;t, a¤ects rm protability and, thus, aggregate activity and it is in turn a¤ected
by the level of aggregate activity. Consequently, variation in y;t could be an important channel
through which shocks are magnied and propagated. In this subsection, the specication for y;t is
given by
y;t = y + y (Yt   Y ) : (31)
That is, y;t is allowed to depend on aggregate real activity, but not on aggregate inventories.
Model properties are presented in table 2, which reports unconditional business cycle moments, and
in gure 2, which displays the impulse response functions (IRFs).
The role of inventories for GDP uctuations. First consider the benchmark results when
y and !0 are chosen such that the model exactly matches the observed cyclical behavior of goods
market e¢ ciency and employment. Since goods-market e¢ ciency is a simple transformation of
33 It is not straightforward to calibrate !0 using direct measures of entrepreneurial compensation. Observed prot
shares include compensation for equity nancing, while in the model 1   !0 is only the compensation for the entre-
preneurial activity of creating a job.
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the inventory-sales ratio, the calibration automatically ensures that the model also matches the
cyclical behavior of the inventory-sales ratio. Table 2 documents that the model predicts the
typical ordering of the volatility of consumption, investment, and output. The calculated shares of
investment in inventories for GDP uctuations are equal to 0.149 and 0.094 when  is equal to 0:7
and 0:95, respectively.34 The empirical counterpart is equal to 0.193. Thus, a non-trivial part of
GDP uctuations is attributable to investment in inventories, although this version of the model
somewhat underpredicts the importance of inventories for business cycle uctuations of GDP.
At the calibrated parameter values, the IRFs of inventories and sales associated with a positive
shock to Zt are positive at all time horizons. With both responses being positive, it is not sur-
prising that the model correctly predicts that inventories are positively correlated at business cycle
frequencies. The model also correctly predicts that inventories and sales are negatively correlated
at higher frequencies. This is more surprising given that the IRFs of both variables are positive.
The reason is that the response of inventories is a bit delayed. This means that the high-frequency
component of the inventories response is initially negative, whereas the high-frequency component
of the real activity response is initially positive.
Magnication and persistence. The autocorrelation coe¢ cients for employment and output
indicate that the model is capable of adding quite a bit of persistence. For example, when  = 0:7,
the autocorrelation coe¢ cients are equal to 0:982 and 0:997 for employment and output, respec-
tively.35
Figure 2 displays the IRFs of employment, output, and goods-market e¢ ciency. To facilitate
comparison, the IRF of productivity is also shown in the panels for the employment IRF and the
output IRF. The variance of the innovation is chosen such that the unconditional variance of Zt
is the same for the two values of . Consequently, the process with the higher value for  has
a smaller innovation variance and, thus, smaller initial responses. The IRFs are given for three
di¤erent values of y. The rst value is the one for which model predictions for y;t match the
observed cyclical behavior of its empirical counterpart. The second value of y considered is 0. A
34Following Fujita and Ramey (2009), this contribution is calculated as follows. Here, eYt is the cyclical
component of GDP divided by its trend value, eXt is the cyclical component of investment in inventories di-
vided by the trend value of GDP, and eY  is dened by eYt = eY  + eXt. The latter identity implies that
variance
eYt =covarianceeYt; eY t +covarianceeYt; eXt. The fraction of GDP uctuations that is attributed to in-
vestment in inventories is, thus, given by covariance
eYt; eXt =varianceeYt :
35Since ltering also a¤ects the autocorrelation, the unltered series are used to calculate these statistics.
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comparison of the responses when y = 0 with the responses for the calibrated value of y reveals
the role of goods-market friction in magnifying and propagating shocks. The third value of y
is such that the model responses to the non-permanent shock considered here are close to being
permanent. By considering higher values of y one learns what the role of goods-market frictions
can be if parameter choice is not constrained by the observed volatility of y;t.
The graphs show that the goods-market friction magnies the employment and output responses
to a shock to Zt. This is not surprising. A negative shock to Zt reduces the size of the market, which
increases the severity of the goods-market friction, which in turn reduces prots and, thus, vacancies,
and employment, that is, a further reduction in the size of the market. The graph also shows that
the employment and output responses are substantially more persistent than the responses of Zt
itself. This is also true when y = 0 and y;t is, thus, constant. When y equals zero, shocks are
propagated because of the matching friction and the desire to smooth consumption. The responses
are more persistent, however, when y is equal to its calibrated value and substantially so when
 = 0:7. The reason for the additional persistence is the following. If the goods-market friction is
more severe, then expected rm prots are lower. Consequently, rms post less vacancies. Lower
vacancies imply a lower job-nding rate, which directly implies a more persistent law of motion for
employment.
When  = 0:95, that is, when the underlying shock is already quite persistent, then the model
does not add a lot of magnication and additional persistence when y is equal to its calibrated
value. When y is increased above its calibrated value, however, then the goods-market friction also
generates remarkable propagation when  = 0:95.
Why this version cannot match all inventory and sales facts. At the calibrated parameter
values, the model predicts that output and sales have roughly the same volatility. In the data,
however, sales are less volatile than output. This somewhat surprising empirical nding has trig-
gered an extensive literature with ingenious attempts to build models to get this right. The model
developed here could generate the right ordering for the volatility of sales and output quite easily.
As indicated in the "y = 0" column in table 2, sales are substantially less volatile than output when
goods-market e¢ ciency is constant, especially when  = 0:7. When y;t is constant, then sales are
simply a fraction of the amount of available goods for sale, that is, newly produced goods plus the
stock of inventories. The latter is a stock variable and less volatile than output. Consequently, when
sales are a constant fraction of the sum of output and inventories, then sales will be less volatile
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than output.
The problem with setting y equal to zero and keeping y;;t constant, however, is that the model
would no longer generate the right cyclical behavior for the goods-market e¢ ciency measure, y;t,
and, thus, would not generate the right cyclical behavior of the inventory-sales ratio. Starting at
zero, an increase in y induces volatility in the goods-market e¢ ciency measure, which is consistent
with the data. As long as y is low enough, the model also correctly predicts that sales are less
volatile than output. However, when y is such that the model matches the volatility of y;t, the
volatility of sales exceeds the volatility of output. Consequently, the model cannot match both the
correct procyclical behavior of y;t and the right relative volatility of sales and output by only
changing y. In the next subsection, it will be shown that the model can match both properties by
allowing y;t to also depend on aggregate inventories.
The role of the goods-market friction when x = 0. The nding that the models implica-
tions become increasingly at odds with well-known facts from the inventory literature as y takes on
higher values also means that the role of the goods-market friction for magnication and propaga-
tion is limited. This is most clear when  = 0:95. In this case, the value of y, which directly a¤ects
the magnitude of cyclical uctuations in the goods-market friction, can be increased a lot before
the models solution becomes explosive. As documented in gure 2, the model generates stunning
magnication and propagation at high values for y. Moreover, gure 2 also documents that y;t
drops just a few percentage points at the highest value for y considered. Although the implied
volatility for y;t is higher than what is observed in the data, the generated changes in y;t do not
seem outlandish. However, some implications for the models properties regarding inventories are
clearly inconsistent with the data when y takes on high values.
It is quite intuitive that making goods-market frictions more important will at some point imply
that the models predictions for sales and inventories deteriorates. Consider a negative TFP shock.
The reduction in economic activity induces a reduction in y;t. The larger the value of y, the
larger the reduction in y;t, which in turn implies stronger magnication and more persistence. But
the reduction in y;t also implies that less is sold relative to what is produced. As the reduction
in y;t becomes larger, then at some point sales will drop by more than output and inventories
will increase. Both properties are inconsistent with observed facts. Again, consider the case when
 = 0:95 and y is set equal to its highest possible value. In this case, the standard deviation of sales
is 1.823 times the standard deviation of output, whereas the empirical ratio is only 0.901. Similarly,
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the correlation between inventories and sales is negative whereas it is positive in the data.
5.2 Results when goods market friction also depends on inventories
The results discussed so far show that the model cannot simultaneously match the correct cyclical
behavior of goods-market e¢ ciency and predict that sales are less volatile than output when y;t
only varies with aggregate output. The empirical results in section 2 indicate, however, that y;t not
only depends on output, but also depends (negatively) on beginning-of-period aggregate inventories.
To capture both aspects the following specication for y;t is considered:
y;t = y + y (Yt   Y ) + x (Xt 1  X) with y > 0, x < 0: (32)
The values of y, x, and !0 are chosen to match the observed volatility of employment, the observed
cyclical behavior of y;t, and the observed value for the volatility of sales relative to the volatility
of output. Table 3 reports unconditional business cycle moments and gure 3 displays the impulse
response functions (IRFs).
The role of inventories for GDP uctuations. As documented in table 3, this version of the
model also generates the right ordering for the volatility of consumption, investment, and output.
At the calibrated parameter values, the share of investment in inventories for cyclical uctuations
in GDP is equal to 0:240 when  equals 0:7 and 0:259 when  = 0:95. Both are fairly close
to the observed share which is equal to 0:193. Moreover, at the calibrated parameter values the
model predicts correctly (again) that inventories and sales are positively correlated at business cycle
frequencies and negatively correlated at high frequencies.
Why this version can match the inventory and sales facts. As pointed out in the previous
subsection, y;t cannot respond too strongly to changes in real activity, because sales would be
more volatile than output if the response is large enough. On the other hand, the response has
to be su¢ ciently strong to ensure that y;t is su¢ ciently volatile. The dilemma of matching both
properties can be solved by letting y;t depend positively on real activity (that is, y > 0) and
as indicated by the empirical ndings discussed in section 2 negatively on beginning-of-period
aggregate inventories (that is, x < 0). In fact, with the appropriate choice of y and x the
model can exactly match the observed volatility and procyclical behavior of y;t (and, thus, match
the observed cyclical behavior of the inventory-sales ratio) as well as exactly match the observed
volatility of sales relative to the volatility of output. Additional support for the specication used
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can be found in the fact that the calibrated values for y and x are not that di¤erent from the
empirical estimates discussed in section 2. For example, when  = 0:95, then the calibrated values
are 0:161 and  0:191 for y and x, respectively. The empirical estimates for these two parameters
are equal to 0:25 and  0:14.36
What does the calibrated specication for y;t imply for the behavior of y;t following a shock
to Zt. The results are given in the two panels of the bottom row of gure 3. Similar to the results
with x = 0, y;t displays a sharp drop when Zt is hit by a negative shock. In contrast to the results
with x = 0, y;t recovers rapidly and goes above its pre-shock value as the reduction in aggregate
inventories puts upward pressure on y;t. The result that the response of y;t switches signs makes
it possible to have a su¢ ciently volatile y;t without making sales too volatile.
The role of the goods-market friction when x < 0. Compared with other models in the
literature that incorporate inventories into business cycle models, the model developed here is
remarkably simple. Despite its simplicity, it can generate key facts about inventories and it captures
the observed importance of investment in inventories for uctuations in aggregate output. The
question arises whether goods-market frictions are an important channel through which shocks get
magnied and propagated when the model matches all key facts regarding the joint behavior of
inventories, sales, and output.
Figure 3 plots the employment and output IRFs at the calibrated values for y and x and when
y is set as high as possible without having explosive responses, keeping x xed. Resembling the
results in section 5.1, employment and output responses are larger and more persistent at higher
values of y. Thus, by increasing y the model can magnify and propagate shocks, but an increase
in y above its calibrated value comes at the cost of doing worse in terms of matching the observed
behavior of inventories. In particular, sales become too volatile relative to output.
The question arises how the model in which y;t is constant compares to the model in which y;t
responds to real activity and accumulated inventories as indicated by the calibrated values for y
and x. That is, how important are changes in goods-market e¢ ciency when the model is calibrated
to be consistent with the joint behavior of inventories, sales, and output. The IRFs for the case
when both y and x are equal to zero are also plotted in gure 3. The gure shows that eliminating
the calibrated uctuations in y;t results in more magnication and more persistence, whereas the
36Since the regression is a¤ected by endogeneity issues, the estimates of y and x should be interpreted with care,
but these theoretical results suggest that a more causal interpreted may not be that unreasonable.
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opposite was found in the previous subsection. The reason is the following. Consistent with the
results in the previous subsection, eliminating the positive dependence of y;t on real activity leads
to less magnication and less persistence. Eliminating the negative dependence of y;t on aggregate
inventories, however, leads to more magnication and more persistence and this e¤ect turns out to
be stronger. The latter e¤ect is only slightly stronger and the employment and output IRFs based
on the calibrated specication for y;t are quite similar to the IRFs based on a constant value for
y;t. Although the richer specication for y;t makes it possible to match the key facts regarding the
behavior of inventories, sales, and output, it also means that variation in the goods-market friction
no longer works as a mechanism to magnify and propagate shocks. The concluding section points
out that this does not necessarily mean that goods-market frictions do not play an important role
in the transmission of shocks, but this role does seem to be restricted by the observed behavior of
inventories. At least in this type of model without any other type of friction such as sticky prices.
6 Goods-market frictions, the verdict
The presumption that frictions in goods markets and frictions in labor markets, and especially their
interaction, are important for business cycles seems reasonable. If frictions prevent goods market
from working e¢ ciently, then this is likely to a¤ect rmssales and rmshiring decisions. Similarly,
if labor markets do not work e¢ ciently, then this will a¤ect the job-nding rate, which in turn will
a¤ect goods-market activity. This paper formalizes this idea and shows that a model with goods
and labor-market frictions can quite easily magnify and propagate shocks. Moreover, the model
can also replicate key aspects of the behavior of inventories, sales, and output. The problem is
that it cannot do both at the same time. Does this mean that realistic goods-market frictions do
not change the dynamics of business cycles very much and that there is, thus, not much point in
incorporating a goods-market friction in business cycle models?
Before addressing these questions, the key aspects of the restrictions that observed inventories,
sales, and output data impose on cyclical changes in the goods-market friction are highlighted.
Suppose that a negative shock hits the economy. If goods-market frictions are procyclical, then
this would mean that such a negative shock would impede sales. The data imply, however, that
rms manage to let output drop by more than sales. This seems to indicate that rms are quite
e¢ cient in scaling down the size of operations during downturns. Moreover, if output drops by more
than sales, then the probability to sell, i.e., the severity of the goods-market friction, cannot have
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worsened too much. That is, the level of sales are not that bad relative to the level of output. If
the goods-market friction would worsen too much, then a negative shock would lead to an increase
in inventories and the drop in sales would exceed the drop in output.
Nevertheless, it is still a good idea to incorporate goods-market frictions, since as documented
in this paper a simple goods-market friction can match key facts about inventories. Given that
changes in the investment in inventories are known to be important for GDP uctuations, it makes
sense to include inventories in business cycle models.
Now consider the question whether the results in this paper indicate that cyclical changes in
goods-market frictions are unlikely to be quantitatively important for aggregate uctuations. The
provision of many types of services does not allow for inventories. If a hairdresser has no customers,
then this does not lead to an increase in inventories. If there are no inventories, then the observed
behavior of inventories cannot impose restrictions on the properties of the goods-market friction
like they do in this paper. But the question arises whether the behavior of goods-market frictions
would be very di¤erent for services than for manufacturing and wholesale.
Another reason why goods market frictions could be more important than the results in this
paper indicate is that the cyclicality of the goods-market friction measure used in this paper un-
derstates the procyclical behavior of the true goods-market friction, because this papers measure
is based on actual output instead of potential output. To explore this possibility, consider the fol-
lowing example. During normal times, rms produce 100 goods, start the period with 100 goods in
inventories, and sell 100 goods. Thus, the sell probability is equal to one-half. In addition, suppose
that rms would like to reduce output to 80 goods when the economy is hit by a negative shock
and the sell probability would remain equal to one-half. If the sell probability would indeed remain
constant, then sales would drop by 10 to 90, which is less than the drop in output, and inventories
would drop to 90. Both responses are consistent with the data. Now suppose that the sell probabil-
ity does not remain equal to one-half, but drops to one third during an economic downturn. If the
rms would still produce 80, then sales would drop to 60, i.e., one third of 180 (80 produced goods
and 100 from inventories). Inventories would increase and the drop in sales is bigger than the drop
in output. Both responses are inconsistent with the data, which is the reasons why the calibrated
models did not consider such large changes in the goods-market friction. But now suppose that
rms can choose to keep labor idle and that there is some benet of doing so.37 Faced with a sharp
drop in sales, one could argue that the rm should lower output further, say to 20 units and enter
37The benet could be a reduction in material costs or a direct utility benet of working less.
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the market this period with 20 newly produced goods and 100 goods in inventories. If the rm
still sells 60, then the observed value for the sell probability would be equal to one-half, that is, the
observed goods-market friction would show no change even though the rm faces a sharp reduction
in the sell probability if one considers actual sales relative to what the rm could produce given the
size of its workforce.
Unfortunately, there are several problems with this reasoning. First, in this numerical example
the amount rms can sell does not depend on the amount of goods that are available. That is, sales
are kept constant at 60 when production is reduced. But the idea of the goods-market friction is that
mismatch between what producers produce and what consumers want is smaller when markets are
bigger. More importantly, if rms can lower actual production during recessions without negatively
a¤ecting the amount they sell, then the question arises why they would not do so during normal
times? If output can be reduced without negatively a¤ecting sales, then rms could lower production
during normal times as well, for example, to a level of 50 units, which if sales remain xed at 100
would imply that the probability to sell increases from one-half to two-thirds. One would have to
argue that this increase in e¢ ciency only happens during downturns, perhaps because operating
e¢ ciently is only essential during downturns or the chance of stockouts are less problematic during
downturns.
Finally, consider the possibility that inventories do not increase during economic downturns and
the sell probability does not drop by that much exactly because the supply of goods falls sharply
during down turns. This may very well be the case, but if in the end the sell probability does
not drop by that much, then why would output drop by so much? If the entrepreneurs share of
the surplus, 1   !0, is small on average, then small changes in y;t can induce large proportional
changes in the entrepreneurs revenue, which in turn leads to large uctuations in job creation and
aggregate output. To generate su¢ ciently volatile employment and aggregate output, this paper
follows Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) and adopts values for !0 that are already quite high.38 But
choosing an even higher value for !0 would not change the conclusion. For example, consider the
case when  is equal to 0.95, y = 0:161, and x = 0. As documented in gure 2 and table 2, in this
case the goods-market friction magnies shocks somewhat, but not by much. If !0 is increased with
one percentage point, then shocks have a substantially larger impact on the economy. For example,
the maximum drop in employment increases considerably, namely from 4.8% to 7.0%. But a similar
increase is observed for the responses when y = 0. And relative to the "y = 0" responses, the
38See tables 2 and 3.
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proportional increase in responses when y is increased to 0:161 is very similar for the two values
of !0 considered.
A Data sources
The analysis is based on quarterly data from 1967Q1 to 2012Q1. Data are from the NIPA tables
of the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). All data are measured in chained 2005 dollar and are
seasonally adjusted. Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is taken from table 1.1.6. The GDP data were
last revised on June 28 2012.
The data based on nal sales uses as inputs: nonfarm inventories to nal sales, nonfarm invento-
ries to nal sales of goods and structures, and nonfarm inventories. Sales data and the goods-market
e¢ ciency measure are constructed using these series. Data are from table 5.7.6A (data up to 1997)
and table 5.7.6B (data from 1997 onward). The data up to 1997 are based on the Standard In-
dustrial Classication (SIC) and the data from 1997 are based on the North American Industry
Classication System (NAICS). The change in classication system has no e¤ect on these aggregate
series. The data from table 5.7.6A were last revised August 11 2011. The data from table 5.7.6B
were last revised June 28 2012.
The disaggregated sector data uses as inputs: end-of-period manufacturing and trade inventories
and manufacturing and trade sales. The inventory-sales ratio and the goods-market e¢ ciency are
constructed using these series. The inventory data are from table 1AU2 (data up to 1997 based
on SIC) and table 1BU (data from 1997 onward based on NAICS). The overlapping data in 1997
are used to rescale the data series and eliminate the discontinuity. The sales data are from table
2AU (data up to 1996 based on SIC) and table 2BU (data from 1997 onward based on NAICS). No
overlapping data are available. Therefore, hypothetical 1997Q1 SIC-based observations are obtained
by extrapolation. The hypothetical 1997Q1 SIC-based observations and the actual 1997Q1 NAICS
observations are used to rescaled the series and eliminate the discontinuity. The results presented
here are based on the case when the growth rates from 1996Q3 to 1996Q4 is used to construct the
hypothetical 1997Q1 observations. Alternatives based on growth rates from the 1996Q1-1998Q4
period give very similar results. The data from tables 1AU2, 2AU, 1BU, and 2BU were last revised
August 11 2011, August 5 2009, June 1 2012, and June 1 2012, respectively.
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B Additional results
B.1 Results for dissagregated data
This appendix reports results based on disaggregated data for the following ve sectors: durable
goods manufacturing, non-durable goods manufacturing, durable goods wholesale, non-durable
goods wholesale, and retail.
Using the series based on gross sales, the mean e¢ ciency measures are substantially higher and
vary between 62% for wholesale durables and 79% for wholesale non-durables. Sales data for the
disaggregated series are gross series, whereas the results reported in the main text are based on nal
sales. Consequently, the results for sectoral series possibly provide an inated view of the e¢ ciency
of the sector as a whole, since gross sales include sales to other rms within the same sector.
Table 4 documents that the results are similar to those presented in the main text for sev-
eral of the series based on sectoral gross sales, but not for all. In particular, the goods-market
e¢ ciency measures are procyclical for the durable and non-durable goods manufacturing sector,
for the durable goods wholesale sector, but they are acyclical for the non-durable wholesale sector
and the retail sector. The question arises whether the comovement between real activity and the
goods-market e¢ ciency in these two sectors remains low if a real activity measure for the sector
itself would be used instead of GDP. One can construct production measures that are consistent
with the sales and inventory data by using the following equation:39
Yt = St +

Xt
1  x  Xt 1

: (33)
Using this real activity measure instead of GDP, the correlation coe¢ cients for the non-durable
goods wholesale and the retail sector, are substantially higher, namely 36% and 35%, respectively.
This is still lower, however, than the corresponding numbers for the other sectors.
Section 2 in the main text documents that the correlation between GDP and goods-market
e¢ ciency is negative at high frequencies. For the series based on the gross sales measures, the
correlation clearly drops if the frequency considered increases, but only four of the ten correlation
coe¢ cients turn negative.
For the measures based on gross sales, the volatility of sectoral output is always higher than the
volatility of sectoral sales, but the di¤erences are smaller than those reported in the main text that
are based on nal sales.
39For these calculations, the depreciation of inventories, x, is set equal to ten percent, but the results are robust
to changes in the depreciation rate used.
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B.2 Results for the projection exercise
In this appendix, the results of the following projection are discussed:
ey;t = y eYt + x eXt 1 + ut; (34)
where the tilde indicates that the series have been detrended. For this exercise, detrending with a
third-order deterministic trend is considered in addition to the HP lter.40 Table 5 documents that
the estimates for y are positive and those for x are negative.
41 Figures 4 and 5 plot goods-market
e¢ ciency measures, together with projected values, when data are detrended using the HP lter
and a deterministic trend, respectively. The dotted lines are the projection of the goods-market
e¢ ciency measure on just the cyclical GDP component. The dashed line is the projection on both
cyclical GDP and cyclical inventories. The cyclical component of GDP clearly tracks key changes in
the goods-market e¢ ciency measures. As documented by these gures and the R-squares of table
5, the t improves substantially if the cyclical component of inventories is included in the basis of
the projection. Regarding the magnitudes, the largest coe¢ cients for y are found for the durable
goods manufacturing sector for which a 1% increase in the cyclical component of GDP corresponds
to a 0.60 percentage point increase in the goods-market e¢ ciency. The smallest e¤ect is found for
the non-durable wholesale sector for which the coe¢ cient is only 0.06.
B.3 Aggregate inventories
Figure 6 plots the cyclical components of GDP and non-farm aggregate inventories. The gure
clearly shows the positive correlation of inventories and GDP, but the gure also documents that the
cyclical component of inventories lags output and frequently continues to decrease (increase) when
the cyclical component of GDP has already passed its turning point and is increasing (decreasing).
Even during deep recessions, the drop in output is followed by a rapid decline in inventories.
40This is not only done to document robustness. Although the exercise is interpreted as a projection and not a
regression, it still would be nice if the right-hand side variables are less endogenous. The problem with the HP-lter
is that the right-hand side variables would not even be predetermined.
41Table 1 in the main text and table 1 in this appendix document that the same is true for the unconditional
correlation of y;t and the two right-hand side variables.
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C Simplied model equations
In the model developed in section 3 of the main text, the price level of the market-produced con-
sumption good, bPt, is allowed to vary freely. That is, the model does not rely on sticky prices. As
long as the specication for wages is for real wages, then the model can be represented by a set of
equations in which the price of the market-produced consumption good is the numeraire and equal
to 1 and the endowment good does not appear. This latter system is simpler, but when the price
of the market-produced consumption good is the numeraire, it is less transparent that prices are
allowed to vary with market conditions.
This simplied model is given by the following set of equations:
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Ct + It +  Vt = y;t
 
0 exp (Zt)K

t N
1 
t +Xt 1

; (35)
It = Kt   (1  k)Kt 1; (36)
t = C
 
t ; (37)
t = Et [t+1 (Rt+1 + (1  k))] ; (38)

t+1 =
t+1
t
=

Ct+1
Ct
 
; (39)
Rt = (y;t + (1  y;t) (1  x)x;t)A exp (Zt) k 1t ; (40)
x;t = (1  n)Et
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1A35 ; (41)
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1 1
; (46)
y;t = y + y (Yt   Y ) + x (Xt 1  X) ; (47)
Xt = (1  n) (1  y;t) (1  x)
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Wt = !0
0@ !1 ((y;t + (1  y;t)(1  x)x;t)0kt  Rtkt)
+ (1  !1)
  
y + (1  y)(1  x)x

0k
  R k
1A : (49)
D A price-dependent goods-market friction
In the model described in the main text, aggregate supply, Yt +Xt 1, is reduced with the fraction
y;t, and the remaining supply is sold in a competitive market. Free entry implies that the expected
prot level associated with job creation is equal to zero. The matching friction, however, implies
that existing rm have a positive surplus. Consequently, the question arises whether rms could not
a¤ect the goods-market friction they face by changing the price they charge. This appendix develops
a version of the model in which rms can a¤ect the amount sold and thus inventory accumulation
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by changing the price of their products. It is shown that the set of equations characterising the
solution to this version of the model is identical to the set of equations given in the main text
characterizing the competitive version when the specication of the goods-market friction y;t is
slightly adjusted. The intuition underlying this result is that rms do not want to fully "undo" the
goods-market friction by lowering their price level, since this benet of price reduction has to be
balanced against the negative impact on rm revenues.
D.1 Specication of the friction
In this version of the model, there is a continuum of rms. If there are no goods-market frictions,
then goods sell at the competitive-equilibrium price, bPCE,t, which satises the following condition:42
bPCE,t @U (Ce;t)
@Ce;t

Ce;t=Ye
= (Yt +Xt 1)  : (50)
Let eiy;t stand for the fraction of goods sold by rm i. This fraction consists of a rm specic
component, ei;t, and a common component, ey;t. In particular,
eiy;t = ei;tey;t. (51)
The rm takes ey;t as given, but the rm can a¤ect the total goods-market friction it faces, eiy;t,
by changing its price level, bPi;t. The motivation is the following. There are several reasons why a
rm may not sell all goods. One possibly reason is that a rm produces goods that customers are
not keen to buy. But one would think that reluctant consumers can be persuaded when they can
buy the good at a lower price. In particular, i;t is assumed to depend negatively on bPi;t= bPt. Thus,
the goods-market friction generates a price dependence that is similar to monopolistic competition.
More specically, the rm-specic component is given by43
ei;t = ei bPi;tbPt ;
bPtbPCE,t
!
(52)
with
e0 bPi;tbPt ;
bPtbPCE,t
!
=
8>><>>:
@ei bPi;tbPt ; bPtbPCE,t

=@
 bPi;tbPt  < 0 if bPt > bPCE,t
@ei bPi;tbPt ; bPtbPCE,t

=@
 bPi;tbPt  < 0 if bPt = bPCE,t (53)
42This is the rst-order condition of the household with the consumption levels of the two goods set equal to the
supplied quantities.
43 If rms have no monopolistic power when bPt = bPCE,t, but
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The degree of "monopolistic power" is assumed to be smaller if the market price, bPt, is closer to
the competitive-equilibrium price, bPCE,t. That is,
@

@ei bPi;tbPt ; bPtbPCE,t

=@
 bPi;t= bPt
@
 bPtbPCE,t

8<: < 0 if bPt > bPCE,t 0 if bPt = bPCE,t : (54)
It is also assumed that
@ei 1; bPtbPCE,t
!
=@
 bPtbPCE,t
!
 0: (55)
This condition ensures that the goods-market friction does not diminish when the price of the
market good increases, at least not in equilibrium when all rms charge the same price.
D.2 Firm problem
The rm problem is now given by
bv(xt 1;St) = max
yt;kt;xt; bPi;t
0@ eiy;t (yt + xt 1) bPi;t   bRtkt  cWt
+ (1  n)Et [
t+1bv(xt;St+1)]
1A
s.t.
yt = 0 exp (Zt) k

t ; (56)
xt = (1  x) (1  eiy;t) (yt + xt 1); (57)
eiy;t = ei bPi;tbPt ;
bPtbPCE,t
!ey;t: (58)
With rms setting prices, there is an additional rst-order condition given by
ei bPi;tbPt ;
bPtbPCE,t
!ey;t + e0i
 bPi;tbPt ;
bPtbPCE,t
!ey;t bPi;t   (1  x) btbPt
!
= 0; (59)
where bt = t bPt is the value of leaving this period with one unit of the good in inventories (after
depreciation).
D.3 Equilibrium price level
In equilibrium, bPi;t = bPt. Equation (59) then determines the equilibrium price level, bPt. That is,
ei 1; bPtbPCE,t
!ey;t + e0i
 
1;
bPtbPCE,t
!ey;t (1  (1  x)t) = 0: (60)
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The solution does not depend on ey;t, since the last equation can be rewritten as
ei 1; bPtbPCE,t
!
+ e0i
 
1;
bPtbPCE,t
!
(1  (1  x)t) = 0: (61)
The value of ey;t still a¤ects rm prots and, thus, employment, but it does not a¤ect prices.
Equation (61) solves for bPt= bPCE,t as a function of t. Consequently, ei;t is a function of t only.
With some abuse of notation, this function is denoted by ei (t). The total goods-market friction,eiy;t, only depends on ey;t and t, since
eiy;t = ei;tey;t = ei 1; bPtbPCE,t
!ey;t = ei (t) ey;t: (62)
To understand how close this version of the model is to the model developed in the main text, con-
sider the case when x = 1.44 In this case, bPt= bPCE,t and ei;t would also be constant. Consequently,
the version with a price-dependent goods-market friction would be identical to the model developed
in the main text except that ey;t is scaled with a constant ei;t. Since the calibration focuses on the
total goods market friction, i.e., eiy;t, this would not a¤ect the results.
Now consider the general case with x < 1. How do changes in t a¤ect the goods-market
friction. It is assumed that the conditions given in equations (54) and (55)are satised. Moreover,
it is assumed that there is an internal solution to equation (61). That is, bPt > bPCE,t. then an
increase in t would lead to an increase in bPt= bPCE,t and a decrease in ei;t. That is, in equilibrium
rms prefer to charge a higher price and sell less. This is intuitive, since t is the value the rm
gets if it does not sell.
D.4 Comparison with benchmark version
The version of the model developed in this appendix endogenizes rm-level price setting and, thus,
inventory accumulation. That is, although rms still face a goods market friction they could choose
to (partially) undo its impact by charging lower prices. The fraction sold in period t is equal to
eiy;t = ei (t) ey;t: (63)
The value of t, and thus the value of ei;t, is a function of the state variables, Zt, Kt 1, Nt 1, and
Xt 1. With another abuse of notation, this function is denoted ei (Zt;Kt 1; Nt 1; Xt 1). Thus,
eiy;t = ei (Zt;Kt 1; Nt 1; Xt 1) ey;t: (64)
44The same conclusion can be drawn if t would be constant, but this condition is not satised.
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The iy subscript indicates that the goods-market e¢ ciency measures comprises both the rm-specic
and the common component. Note, however, that eiy;t is the same for all rms, since the value of
t is the same for all rms.ei (Zt;Kt 1; Nt 1; Xt 1) is a xed function of the state variables. Suppose that
ey;t = y;tei (Zt;Kt 1; Nt 1; Xt 1) ; (65)
where y;t is the specication of the goods-market friction in the benchmark version of the model.
In this case, eiy;t = ei (t) ey;t = y;t: (66)
For this specication of ey;t, the friction that rms face in the economy with a price-dependent
goods-market friction, eiy;t, is exactly equal to the friction that rms face in the benchmark version
of the model, y;t. That is, the model with a price-dependent goods-market friction is identical to
the benchmark version of the model when y;t is modied as in equation (65). Moreover, if the
behavior of y;t is consistent with properties of its empirical counterpart, then the same is true for
the behavior of eiy;t. As documented in appendix D.5, the modication of y;t is relatively minor.
Now suppose that ey;t = y;t. In this case, the behavior of the friction that rms face is di¤er-
ent in the two economies. The question arises whether uctuations in the rm-specic component,ei (t), dampen or amplify uctuations in ey;t. Recall that t denotes the value of leaving period t
with a unit of the good in inventories and that ei (t) depends negatively on t. Inventory accumu-
lation is a form of savings and the value of savings increases if agents become richer. Consequently,ei (t) depends negatively on Zt, Kt 1, and Nt 1, whereas ey;t (= y;t) depends positively on these
three variables. This means that rms would adjust prices to partly o¤set changes in ey;t. This
means that ey;t would have to be more cyclical than y;t, if eiy;t is equal to y;t.
Now consider the e¤ect of Xt 1 on ei (t). Starting the period with a larger stock of goods mean
that the agent is richer, which in turn implies that ei (t) depends negatively on Xt 1.45 Thus, the
ability of rms to a¤ect the goods-market friction actually amplies the dependence of the goods-
market friction on aggregate inventories. Note eiy;t also depends negatively on aggregate inventories
when ey;t does not depend onXt 1, that is when x = 0. Endogenous price setting can, thus, explain
the observed negative dependence of the goods-market friction on aggregate inventories.
45 If an increase in Xt 1 has a very large negative impact on ey;t, then an increase in inventories could reduce welfare
and a social planner would like to destory inventories. But this possibility is not plausible.
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D.5 Example to document similarity
The rm-specic component of the goods-market friction is given by
ei;t =  0    1;t  bPi;tbPt with (67)
 1;t =  1
 bPtbPCE,t
!
and (68)
@ 1 (x)
@x
< 0: (69)
That is, a rm can lower the goods-market friction it faces by lowering its price level, bPi;t. The
extent to which the rm can do so is given by  1;t. The closer the price level is to the competitive
equilibrium outcome, the lower the value of  1;t, that is, the harder it is for rms to a¤ect the
goods-market friction.
For this specication of ei;t, equation (61) can be written as
 0    1;t    1;t (1  (1  x)x;t) = 0; (70)
which implies that
 1;t =
 0
2  (1  x)x;t (71)
and ei;t =  01  (1  x)x;t
2  (1  x)x;t

: (72)
The value of  0 is chosen to ensure that ei;t is equal to 1 in steady state.
Figure 7 plots y;t using the calibration from the main text when all inventory facts are matched
for the indicated value of . Thus, x < 0. It also plots y;t=ei;t. This is the specication for ey;t
such that the total goods-market friction in the model with a price-dependent friction is identical
to the friction of the benchmark version of the model.46 The graph shows that the behavior is
fairly similar. Consistent with the discussion above, y;t=ei (Zt;Kt 1; Nt 1; Xt 1) is more volatile
than y;t. That is, to end up with the same cyclical behavior for the total goods-market e¢ ciency
measure in the model with a price-dependent goods-market friction, one needs a somewhat stronger
market-size externality.
46For both values of , the steady state value of  1;t is equal to 0:76. That is, if a rm lowers its price level, bPi;t,
to a level that is 1% below the average price level, bPt, then the goods market friction this rm faces decreases with
0:76%:
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Figure 1: Cyclical behavior of goods-market e¢ ciency
Notes: The top panel plots the cyclical component of GDP. The solid line in the bottom panel
is the cyclical component of goods-market e¢ ciency (plus the mean). If the e¢ ciency measure is
equal to 0.5, then sales are 50% of newly produced output plus inventories. The bottom panel
also plots the tted values from a projection using cyclical GDP (dotted line) and the tted values
from a projection using cyclical GDP and lagged cyclical inventories (dashed line).
41
Figure 2: IRFs when not all key inventory facts are matched
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Notes: Each panel plots the responses to a productivity shock. The IRF labeled "calibrated y"
corresponds to the case when y and !0 are chosen to match N=Y and y=Y . This version of
the model does not match the observed value of S=Y .
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Figure 3: IRFs when key inventory facts are matched
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Notes: Each panel plots the responses to a productivity shock. The IRF labeled "calibrated y,x"
corresponds to the case when y, x, and !0 are chosen to match N=Y , y=Y , and S=Y .
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Figure 4: Fitted goods-market e¢ ciency (detrending with the HP lter)
Notes: Each panel plots for the indicated market the cyclical component of goods-market e¢ ciency
(solid line), the tted values from a regression using cyclical GDP (dotted line), and the tted values
from a regression using cyclical GDP and lagged cyclical inventories (dashed line). If the e¢ ciency
measure is equal to 0.5, then sales are 50% of newly produced output plus inventories.
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Figure 5: Fitted goods-market e¢ ciency (detrending with a deterministic trend)
Notes: Each panel plots for the indicated market the cyclical component of goods-market e¢ ciency
(solid line), the tted values from a regression using cyclical GDP (dotted line), and the tted values
from a regression using cyclical GDP and lagged cyclical inventories (dashed line). If the e¢ ciency
measure is equal to 0.5, then sales are 50% of newly produced output plus inventories.
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Figure 6: Cyclical behavior of GDP and non-farm inventories
Notes: Data are detrended using the HP lter.
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Figure 7: Modication of y;t needed to get identical results in both versions
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Notes: The panels plot timeseries for y;t generated by the benchmark version when all inventory
facts are matched. It also plots the value of ey;t such that the version of the model with a price-
dependent goods-market friction is identical to the benchmark version, i.e., y;t=ei(x;t).
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Table 1: Summary statistics - Private non-farm inventories and nal sales
total goods + structures
X;S 0.632 0.648
X;S , BP4Q -0.364 -0.358
X;S , BP8Q -0.269 -0.270
X;S 0.356 0.361
S=Y 0.909 0.902
X;S , BP4Q 1.033 0.970
X;S , BP8Q 1.006 0.972
mean y;t 0.550 0.401
mean Xt=St 0.821 1.498
y 0.0041 0.0047
y=S 0.215 0.184
y ;Y 0.362 0.607
y ;X 1 -0.508 -0.251
Notes: BPNQ indicates that the band-pass lter is used to extract that part of the series
that is associcated with uctuations with a period less than N quarters. All other second-
order moments are for HP-detrended data. i is the standard deviation of variable i; i;j is
the correlation coe¢ cient of variables i and j; S stands for sales, X stands for inventories,
Y stands for GDP, and y = S=(Y +X 1) is the measure of goods-market e¢ ciency.
48
Table 2: Results when not all key inventory facts are matched
data model with  = 0:7 model with  = 0:95
y; !0
calibrated
y = 0 high Y
y; !0
calibrated
y = 0 high y
parameter values
y 0.162 0 0.193 0.162 0 0.600
x 0 0 0 0 0 0
!0 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.970 0.970 0.970
calibrated moments
N=Y 0.466 = 0.357 0.499 = 0.386 0.732
Y =Y 0.162 = 0 0.189 = 0 0.566
S=Y 0.901 1.006 0.775 1.064 1.045 0.853 1.823
inventory properties
X;S 0.648 0.674 0.845 0.644 0.803 0.913 -0.509
X;S , BP4Q -0.358 -0.690 -0.485 -0.700 -0.602 -0.364 0.485
X;S , BP8Q -0.270 -0.086 0.286 -0.118 0.010 0.369 0.123
standard business cycle statistics
C=Y 0.535 0.338 0.238 0.367 0.447 0.354 0.896
I=Y 3.554 3.710 2.906 3.935 3.199 2.676 12.431
role of investment in inventories for GDP uctuations
XY =
2
Y 0.193 0.149 0.384 0.108 0.094 0.316 -0.461
autocorrelation unltered series
N;N( 1) 0.982 0.9153 0.994 0.993 0.989 0.999
Y;Y ( 1) 0.997 0.984 0.999 0.996 0.995 1.000
Notes: This table reports summary statistics of model-generated data and the empirical counter-
parts. BPNQ indicates that the band-pass lter is used to extract that part of the series that is
associated with uctuations with a period less than N quarters. All other second-order moments
are for HP-detrended data. i is the standard deviation of variable i; i;j is the correlation co-
e¢ cient of variables i and j; S stands for sales, X stands for inventories, Y stands for GDP, Y 
is the output measure for these rms data (constructed using the sales and inventory data), and
y = S=(Y +X 1) is the measure of goods-market e¢ ciency.  is the autoregressive coe¢ cient in
the law of motion for productivity, Zt. For both values of , the table has three columns. The rst
column gives the results when y and !0 are chosen to match N=Y and y=Y . Not matched
is the value of S=Y . The second column gives the results when y is set equal to 0. The third
column gives the results when y is set to the highest possible value for which model data are
non-explosive. "=" indicates that this model characteristic matches its empirical counterpart by
construction.
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Table 3: Results when all key inventory facts are matched
data model  = 0:7 model  = 0:95
y; x; !0
calibrated
y = 0
x = 0
high y
y; x; !0
calibrated
y = 0
x = 0
high y
parameter values
y 0.161 0 0.220 0.161 0 0.355
x -0.178 0 -0.178 -0.191 0 -0.191
!0 0.993 0.993 0.993 0.980 0.980 0.980
calibrated moments
N=Y 0.466 = 0.474 0.582 = 0.488 0.757
y=Y 0.162 = 0 0.211 = 0 0.314
S=Y 0.901 = 0.788 1.046 = 0.861 2.521
inventory properties
X;S 0.648 0.327 0.858 0.326 0.433 0.919 -0.228
X;S , BP4Q -0.358 -0.741 -0.456 -0.721 -0.519 -0.323 0.128
X;S , BP8Q -0.270 -0.362 0.903 -0.351 -0.215 0.340 0.050
standard business cycle statistics
C=Y 0.535 0.252 0.262 0.353 0.359 0.378 1.008
I=Y 3.554 3.571 2.910 3.92 2.903 2.724 16.900
role of investment in inventories for GDP uctuations
XY =
2
Y 0.193 0.240 0.372 0.118 0.259 0.308 -0.265
autocorrelation unltered series
N;N( 1) 0.933 0.949 0.991 0.990 0.992 1.000
Y;Y ( 1) 0.977 0.987 0.998 0.993 0.995 1.000
Notes: This table reports summary statistics of model-generated data and the empirical counter-
parts. BPNQ indicates that the band-pass lter is used to extract that part of the series that is
associated with uctuations with a period less than N quarters. All other second-order moments
are for HP-detrended data. i is the standard deviation of variable i; i;j is the correlation co-
e¢ cient of variables i and j; S stands for sales, X stands for inventories, Y stands for GDP, Y 
is the output measure for these rms data (constructed using the sales and inventory data), and
y = S=(Y +X 1) is the measure of goods-market e¢ ciency.  is the autoregressive coe¢ cient in
the law of motion for productivity, Zt. For both values of , the table has three columns. The rst
column gives the results when y, x, and !0 are chosen to match N=Y , S=Y , and y=Y .
The second column gives the results when y and x are set equal to 0. The third column gives the
results when y is set to the highest possible value for which model data are non-explosive. "="
indicates that this model characteristic matches its empirical counterpart by construction.
50
Table 4: Summary statistics - Sectoral inventory and gross sales data
manufacturing wholesale retail
durable non-durable durable non-durable
X;S 0.416 0.338 0.646 0.434 0.687
X;S , BP4Q 0.079 -0.104 -0.004 0.056 -0.159
X;S , BP8Q -0.121 0.078 0.098 0.262 -0.167
X;S 0.626 0.330 0.449 0.049 0.231
S=Y 0.973 0.977 0.964 0.985 0.943
X;S , BP4Q 0.972 0.945 0.781 0.902 0.922
X;S , BP8Q 0.978 0.931 0.890 0.936 0.962
mean y 0.628 0.732 0.616 0.786 0.683
mean X=S 0.594 0.367 0.630 0.274 0.465
y 0.0113 0.0049 0.0096 0.0043 0.0043
y=S 0.22 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.17
y ;Y  0.812 0.744 0.759 0.331 0.323
y ;Y 0.753 0.524 0.718 0.085 0.058
y ;X 1 -0.373 -0.402 -0.145 -0.390 -0.356
Notes: BPNQ indicates that the band-pass lter is used to extract that part of the
series that is associcated with uctuations with a period less than N quarters. All other
second-order moments are for HP-detrended data. i is the standard deviation of variable
i; i;j is the correlation coe¢ cient of variables i and j; S stands for sales, X stands for
inventories, Y stands for GDP, Y  is the output measure for the group of rms considered
(constructed using the sales and inventory data), and y = S=(Y + X 1) is the measure
of goods-market e¢ ciency.
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Table 5: Cyclicality of observed goods-market e¢ ciency
ey;t = y eYt + x eXt 1 ey;t = y eYt
y x R
2 R2
HP detrending
nal sales 0.25 -0.14 0.67 0.38
gross sales
dur. manufacturing 0.60 -0.20 0.82 0.57
nondur. manufacturing 0.21 -0.17 0.60 0.27
dur. wholesale 0.51 -0.12 0.66 0.52
nondur. wholesale 0.06 -0.07 0.19 0.006
retail 0.13 -0.11 0.27 0.004
detrending with time trend
nal sales 0.25 -0.13 0.67 0.27
gross sales
dur. manufacturing 0.52 -0.16 0.72 0.50
nondur. manufacturing 0.16 -0.13 0.50 0.18
dur. wholesale 0.42 -0.11 0.51 0.29
nondur. wholesale 0.18 -0.13 0.57 0.21
retail 0.19 -0.11 0.45 0.00
Notes: All series are detrended by the indicated detrending procedure. The last column
displays the R2 when goods-market e¢ ciency, ey;t, is projected on GDP, eYt, only. The
other three columns display the projection coe¢ cients and the R2 when ey;t is projected
on GDP and beginning-of-period t inventories, eXt 1.
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